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The euro, which replaced eleven national currencies on 1 January 1999, became the single 
currency of the European Union. It is therefore an international currency, which is not without 
important consequences for the international monetary system. Can the euro fulfill the functions 
of such a currency: the answer is affirmative. Will it actually fulfill these functions and become a 
competitor of the dollar? The answer is more uncertain: yes, but without knowing to what extent 
or at what rate. One of the reasons for this uncertainty is the offer of the euro as an international 
currency, that is to say the terms of its creation, which will be linked to the international 
transactions of the Union. Finally, the international monetary system is still that of Bretton 
Woods, in which the IMF plays an important role: how will the Euro be represented, how will 
the Fund integrate the euro into its operations, such as the SDR, and how will it monitor 
exchange rate policies? 
 
EMU accelerated with the adoption of the Delors Plan for Economic and Monetary Union in 
Europe 1n1989. As the project took shape and when it appeared that it was likely to come to 
fruition, one of the most debated issues concerned the international role the euro could play and, 
beyond that, the impact that this new currency would have on the international monetary system. 
The answer was not easy as the contours of the future monetary union, remained uncertain. 
Would the United Kingdom enter, and sterling cease to exist? Would Italy and Spain also enter 
and allow better compensation within the EU between the countries of the North and the 
countries of the South? These uncertainties were lifted in May 1998, together with that relating 
to the calculation of conversion rates in euros. 
On January 1, 1999, eleven countries formed the currency union and the euro replaced eleven 
national currencies. National currencies could still be used for three years and coins and 
banknotes for six months longer. Since 1 January 1999, the euro has therefore been able to 
develop its international role, which will not be without consequences for the international 
monetary system (Kirrane 1996). 
This system is currently two-sided. The official face corresponds to the rules enacted at Bretton 
Woods and several times since amended. The euro will be a problem at this level, for example, 
the International Monetary Fund, had to replace eleven national currencies. In addition, the 
supervision exercised by the Fund, as well as the conditionality to which its aid is subject, will 
henceforth concern the Union at the same time as each member country (Kirrane 1995).  
The mark is replaced by the euro, which naturally becomes a much more serious competitor for 
the dollar, and even more so for the yen. Monetary polycentrism may be rapidly realised, but in 
conditions different from those previously imagined. It is no longer a national currency this time, 
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but a regional currency, common to several countries that constitute a substantially larger 
economic and financial unit. 
The impact of the euro on the international monetary system will be by examined by attempting 
to answer the following questions: 
- to what extent can the euro fulfill the traditional functions of an international currency? The 
answer is easy: it fills them, and all; 
- to what extent can it effectively compete with the dollar and partially replace it? The answer 
is much less easy, and we will see why; 
- how can the euro, used as a national currency by residents of eleven European countries, 
become an international currency used by non-residents? 
- what are the consequences of the introduction of the euro on the International Monetary 
Fund, on its operations, on its activity? 
Can the Euro fill the functions of an international currency?  
The traditional functions of money are well known: the currency is a unit of account, a means of 
payment, a reserve. These functions are necessarily linked: it is the billing currency that is used 
in transactions. At the international level, in relations with or between non-residents, these 
functions are a little more complex, but they remain closely linked (Benassy and Deusy-Fournier  
1994). An international currency must be able to be used in invoicing of trade in goods and 
services, that is to say in a certain proportion of international trade. As a result, this currency 
must be easy to use, which supposes an efficient banking organisation, guaranteeing limited 
transaction costs. It must also be widely used in interventions, so as to make conversions on 
foreign exchange markets easy. And to do this, it must be largely owned by central banks and 
constitute a significant part of their reserves. All these functions can easily be exercised by the 
new European currency (Kirrane 1996). 
On a commercial level, the euro can be widely used as a unit of account in trade between EU 
member states and the rest of the world. European countries are very largely open to the outside, 
their exports and imports represent on average 24% of their GDP against 11.5% for the United 
States and 9% for Japan. But these percentages have lost their significance simply because of the 
changeover to the euro. A significant part of the foreign trade of each of the eleven - 50% in 
1996 - is carried out with its partners.
1
 It is intra-Community trade that will become internal to 
the Union and be billed and settled in the single currency. The euro is therefore destined to 
become one of the main currencies of trade between countries in the world. 
The euro can also become a major international settlement currency. On the one hand, the eleven 
constitute an economic group of the same order as the United States, with a Gross Domestic 
Product, equal to 87% of US GDP, and a population that is even slightly higher. The euro will 
therefore be a known currency, not just around the Union. In this respect, tourism will 
undoubtedly play a vital role which will be amplified when notes circulate, the biggest note is 
500 euros, currently 520 dollars. Moreover, the Community was aware of the need to align the 
national payment systems before moving to the single currency. Working groups were set up for 
this purpose in 1991, which called for greater transparency, better organised competition, 
harmonisation of standards and legal rules. The initiatives that followed allowed both to 
harmonise national systems (for small amounts), to set up in each country a system of real-time 
Gross Settlements, and to link these by a common system. The latter, which is managed by the 
European Central Bank (ECB), is supposed to facilitate monetary policy operations, but it can 




also be used to settle large-value payments. Transactions with or by non-residents are naturally 
treated and compensated with the same time as transactions between residents of the eleven. It 
should be added that the compensation system of the ECU Banking Association is maintained, 
and that British, Danish, Swedish, but also Swiss, Japanese and American banks have been 
participating for some years, not to mention the banks Polish, Hungarian, Czech, Bulgarian and 
Russian partners since 1993. 
Transactions in euros with or between non-residents will not be only commercial transactions, 
there will also be much more financial transactions. And there will be a large volume of 
securities, assets or claims in euros held by non-residents. The euro will not only be used as a 
unit of account in which these securities or claims are denominated, it will itself be a reserve 
asset. On the one hand, it will be held as an international currency per se, in the form of current 
accounts
1
 open to non-residents, and it will be held as international liquidity, in the form of 
shares, bonds, deposits term or other receivables. These operations should be facilitated by the 
existence of particularly developed financial markets, such as those of Frankfurt, Paris and in 
London where transactions in euros have started to take place since 1 January. The euro is all the 
more likely to become a major investment currency as non-residents have become accustomed to 
investing a lot in the Union: significantly more than in the United States and three times more 
than in Japan. 
The last quality that is expected of an international reserve asset concerns its value: it must be a 
strong currency, unlikely to depreciate in the long term, and a stable currency that is unlikely to 
fluctuate in the short term. Will the euro offer this double advantage? The question is much 
discussed. It will probably be a strong currency because the European System of Central Banks 
(ESCB) primary mission to ensure price stability. This is why its statutes make it highly 
independent. Moreover, at the beginning of the single currency and the common monetary 
policy, the ECB must establish its credibility and build its ‘reputation’. And yet, a strong euro 
could be a problem for the European economies hit by unemployment or the recession, it could 
create political difficulties in one or other member countries, which would weaken the image of 
the single currency (Bourguinat 1998). Will the euro be more stable than the currencies it will 
replace? Yes, if the exchange agreements envisaged by Article 109 of the Maastricht Treaty are 
concluded and actually put into practice. But as the opening to the outside of the consolidated 
euro zone is automatically reduced, the fluctuations of the euro will cause less disruption, and the 
ECB may attach less importance to the external value of its currency (McCauley1997). And, in 
any case, does it not risk, like all central banks, being sometimes powerless in the face of market 
forces? 
Is such uncertainty really a hindrance to the international role of the euro? Whether strong or 
weak, it cannot remain so indefinitely. It will be perfectly capable, like the dollar, of fulfilling all 
the functions of an international currency, much better than the ecu which was not a full-fledged 
coin, but a basket of other currencies it did not replace; it was not the currency of any country 
and had no ‘monetary habitat’. Despite the efforts of a few commercial banks, it could not be 
easily transferred, and despite the initiatives of a few central banks a few years ago, it never 
became independent of the currencies of the basket and its liquidity had never been guaranteed 
by a ‘lender of last resort’. 
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 Exactly 49.7% of exports and 49.3% of imports in 1996. Calculations based on the geographical breakdown of each country's 
foreign trade. IMF, Directorate of Trade Statistics Quarterly, March 1998. The percentages announced are often higher: "more 
than 60%," according to GS Tavlas, The International Role of Currencies - The US Dollar and the Euro, IMF, Finance and 
Development, June 1998, pp. 42-45. In this case, they generally concern all fifteen member countries of the European Union. 
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Will the euro compete against the dollar?  
As much as the euro is capable of playing an international role, it is difficult to say what the role 
will be, and to what extent or at what rate it will replace the dollar. In this respect, many 
forecasts have been made, and many hypotheses have been developed which lead to different 
results. One thing is certain: substitution can only be done slowly. Use creates habits that are not 
easily lost. That is why it is more difficult to become an international currency than to remain so 
(Benassy, Italianer and Pisani-Ferry 1993). There are a few factors that can accelerate the 
internationalisation of a currency, but the phenomenon is particularly difficult to overcome 
quickly. 
The euro will undoubtedly have an important role in the invoicing of exchanges. European 
currencies were recently used in 33% of world trade, and the dollar in 48% (Ilzkovitz 1996). The 
share of the euro could also be expected to be 33%. However, this percentage corresponds to all 
European currencies, some of which are not part of the eleven replaced by the euro (the pound 
sterling, the Swiss franc, etc.). But conversely, the trade between the eleven, which will always 
be international trade, should be done entirely in the common currency of these partners. 
Moreover, the role of the euro can only extend to trade with neighboring countries. Central 
Europe, for example, has strongly reoriented its trade with the countries of the Community. The 
forecasts are however random. 
Grassman's well-known law, according to which about two-thirds of an industrialised country's 
exports and one-third of its imports are billed and settled in its national currency, can be applied. 
It is then 22.5% of the foreign trade of the eleven that should be done in euros. It is a similar 
percentage (24%) that Hartman proposes by extrapolating the role of the mark to the euro 
(Hartmann 1991).  
The coefficient of internationalisation defined as the ratio of exports denominated in one 
currency to the exports of the issuing country can be considered, assuming, for example, that the 
coefficient of the euro could reach that of the mark (1.4).  The calculation is not obvious. 
Applying this coefficient to euro area exports as a country, the euro would be used in 34% of 
world trade; if applied to the exports of the eleven countries in the zone, the euro would be used 
in 39% of world trade. 
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 It has even been advanced by 50%, which means that the euro and the 
dollar would be practically used equally in the billing of world trade and probably in its 
regulation (Ilzkovitz 1996). The transition will be slow, however, because the habits in this area 
are stubborn and the companies do not change their business methods overnight, especially as 
national currencies will survive until 2002 (Kirrane 1996).  
Like the ecu, the euro is present on all the behaviour of the financial markets and it is one of the 
currencies in which the assets are held. But it does not only replace ecu, it also replaces the other 
national currencies to the detriment of the dollar. The changeover to the euro will not fail to 
accelerate this development, because of the unification of the European financial markets which 
will contribute to increase their liquidity, even if, for the moment, London's place remains 
outside the euro zone (Le Quere 1999).  
The difficulty in assessing the impact of the euro is firstly that the breakdown of operations is 
given for the banks of the different countries (thus for the financial markets), and for the 
                                                          
2
 Exports of the Eleven accounted for 28% of world exports in 1997, half of which are exports among the Eleven. The 
calculations are as follows: (14% x 1.4) + 14% = 34% and (28% x 1.4) = 39%.  
 




currencies each time globally, without knowing which currencies are used by the banks of each 
country, and consequently by those of the eleven. We only know that: 
- foreign currency liabilities to residents will decrease, as they are banks of the eleven and 
currencies are currencies of the partner countries. Thus, the French banks' liabilities in lire have 
become commitments in national currency; foreign currency liabilities to non-residents will also 
decrease, as the liabilities of the banks of the eleven countries have become, in part, 
commitments in national currency and they should be broken down henceforth into commitments 
to non-residents of the country, residents of the Union, and in commitments to non-residents of 
the Union; 
- commitments in national currencies towards non-residents are not modified. Insofar as these 
commitments concern banks located in the eleven countries, they have become commitments in 
euros. At December 31, 1998, the commitments of the eleven in dollars amounted to $783 
billion. 
The introduction of the euro will finally have consequences for the foreign currency holdings of 
central banks, 57% of which were made up of dollars at the end of 1997. This percentage, which 
declined before 1990, has since increased and now seems to be stabilising (IMF, Annual Report, 
1998). The impact of the euro is often analysed, because these assets have an official character, 
because they are the best known and because their variations should be easier to predict. The 
reality is probably different. These holdings will decrease because the central banks no longer 
need to hold the currencies of their partners to intervene in the foreign exchange markets, and 
because, in any case, such assets, which have become assets in their common currency, are 
consolidated (Kirrane 1996). But this decrease will appear not widespread, because as part of the 
European Monetary System, central banks were required to keep only limited amounts of the 
currencies of their partners. On the other hand, as the euro becomes an international currency, 
foreign central banks will probably hold more money than they hold marks or francs. Finally, the 
question remains as to how the dollar assets will evolve: those of the ECB whose foreign 
exchange policy is hard to predict, those of foreign central banks that may wish to better 
diversify their holdings in foreign exchange. When the euro will really compete with the dollar? 
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The volume of official reserves in euros will also depend on the number of countries that decide 
to peg their currency to the European currency. This anchoring role of the euro will also have 
consequences for its importance in international trade. Already, some countries which had 
pegged their currency to the mark under a currency board have attached it to the euro: Bulgaria, 
Estonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina. Similarly, the countries of the franc zone - they are fifteen - 
saw their currency, hitherto attached to the franc, automatically attached to the euro, as Cape 
Verde whose currency was attached to the Portuguese escudo. Many countries also allow their 
currency to float within certain limits, either directly against the euro (the Czech and Slovak 
Republics, Slovenia, Hungary on 1 January 2000), or more frequently compared to a basket that 
                                                          
3 Estimates circulating in this respect reflect above all "the inability to make estimates: they range from 0 to 200 billion dollars. 
Y.T. Silguy, op.cit., page 365. This figure of 200 billion is given by P.N. Mc Cauley for the case where all developing countries 
would hold dollars and euros tied. Op.cit., Page 40. 
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now includes the euro: Poland, but also Turkey, Israel, Botswana, Chile and probably Morocco. 
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But the situation is not fixed, and other countries could someday adopt the euro as a reference. It 
could be other African countries, or even the countries of the Mediterranean Basin. And one 
wonders what could be decided by Russia or other countries of the former USSR, China other 
Latin American countries (McCauley 1997 and Kirrane 1994). This means that the impact of the 
euro on the international monetary system is still very hard to imagine. 
The international creation of euros  
So far, we have considered the role that the euro could play starting from the functions that it 
could fulfill, that is to say the services that it could render. It is the ‘demand’ aspect that is most 
often studied. But the euro can only be an international currency if the agents who want to use it 
have the quantities they need, in other words if enough is created. This is the ‘offer aspect, which 
is rarely mentioned but is essential if it is to become an International currency that can be used 
by non-residents. It will therefore have to be transferred to them, and this can only be done 
during transactions carried out between the euro area with the rest of the world and recorded in 
the balance of payments. 
The mechanism is simple. Every time a resident does a transaction with a non-resident in his 
own currency, it becomes an international currency. This is the case when it imports but the 
opposite occurs when its exports are settled in its currency which becomes national again: the 
balance of these transactions must therefore be considered. It is the same when a company 
invests abroad or when a bank grants abroad a credit in its currency. Each time, the current 
account of a non-resident in a resident bank is credited and the total of these transfers 
corresponds to the creation of an international currency. These non-resident demand deposits are 
then placed at maturity or used to acquire securities or make investments: the international 
currency is transformed into cash. The balance of payments, which lists all these transactions, 
can actually be presented in the form of a balance sheet - in flow, it is true - with on the liabilities 
side the total of the foreign liabilities of the country corresponding to the creation of the 
international currency and to the credit the counterparts of this creation. 
The creation of the international currency corresponds to all of these countries' external 
liabilities, the majority of which did not remain monetary but took the form of liquidity: $734 
billion. It is nearly the same amount as the US Balance of Payments: $733 billion; they are 
clearly higher than the corresponding one in Japan, $171 billion. This comparison must, 
however, be interpreted with serious reservations. 
Money creation is of the same order. For the eleven, the balance of current operations is in 
surplus, their assets have therefore increased since 1997 more than their commitments, they were 
financed in part (12.5%) by their current account surplus. It is the same for Japan, where this 
percentage reaches 35%. For the United States, on the other hand, the current account is in 
deficit, so their commitments have increased more than their assets, and they have contributed 
21% to finance this deficit (de Larosière 1998).  
The above data are global, they concern all eleven. Their balances of payments have been 
grouped, but the situation of countries is not homogeneous. In 1997, three countries had a current 
                                                          
4 The weight of the euro is different in each case because it is decided by each country. Since January 1st 1999, it is 
approximately 30% in the SDR to which are attached several currencies. But this time the euro is not directly chosen as a 
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account deficit; France and Germany accounted for 54% of foreign direct investment and 45% of 
portfolio investment; France and Belgium received 57% of direct investment from abroad, 
Germany and Italy accounted for 52% of portfolio investment; Germany alone accounted for 
36% of bank assets and liabilities. 
The cumulative balance of payments at the Union level groups the transactions made by each 
country with the rest of the world. Will those that are carried out with its partners still be 
international transactions as soon as they are settled in a single currency which will be the 
national currency of each of these countries? Will the euro become an international currency 
when it is lent by a German bank to an Austrian company, or when it allows a Spanish firm to 
import Portuguese products? If not, it is obvious that only a consolidated balance of payments 
will be able to account for the creation of euros as an international currency. The aggregates 
measured above will therefore be much smaller. 
A more serious problem is that not all the international transactions of the eleven are carried out 
in their national currency, as they are in the United States. These transactions are also carried out 
in foreign currencies, notably in dollars. When countries do not feel utilise their own currencies 
in their relations with the outside, they do not have any impact on international money creation. 
The increase in the commitments of the eleven in 1997 ($734 billion) therefore only represents a 
part of the transformation of their own currency into an international currency. It is not possible 




In other words, the eleven constitute an area that, in monetary terms, is less autonomous, so to 
speak, than the United States. In its foreign relations, this country uses only its own currency, the 
eleven use their currency, but also those of their partners along with the dollar. The euro will 
allow Europe to come closer in this respect to the United States, because the eleven will use 
more and more their currency in their operations with the rest of the world and this is how the 
euro can become an international currency (Kirrane 1996). But two unknowns remain: at what 
rate will the eleven replace the currencies (the dollar) with the euro and the United States will 
they not, little by little, use the euro instead of the dollar in some of their transactions, for 
example in their transactions with the eleven? 
The international currency can also be a euro-currency. International cash in dollars includes 
assets of non-residents in banks in the United States, but also in banks abroad: they are Euro-
dollars. Similarly, holdings in euros may be held with banks located in countries other than the 
eleven: these will be ‘euro-euros’. The operations of these foreign exchange banks do not affect 
the creation of the international currency proper, but through the deposit and credit mechanism, 
they lead to an increase in international liquidity. It will be for the euro as for the dollar. The 
holdings in euros will include both euros linked to the operations of the eleven with the rest of 
the world and euros linked to the operations of banks in the world. 
It would be imprudent to venture into any numerical forecast. We do not have the elements that 
would make it possible to draw up a consolidated balance sheet of the euro system at the level of 
the eleven and with regard to their own currencies. But it is likely that two influences will be 
exerted, and in the opposite direction. The first is that the banks of the eleven that are in the euro 
system with regard to the dollar will no longer be there with regard to the euro. These banks now 
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 The operations of the banking sector are broken down on the French balance of payments, for example, according to that it 
involves assets and liabilities in foreign currency or francs. But the other operations are not broken down. 
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account for more than 36% of euro-currency transactions.
6
 Only the others, in London (for now), 
in Zurich, Montreal or Singapore will be able to do operations in ‘euro-euros’. The second is that 
the euro will gradually compete with the dollar. Even if the evolution is slow because the inertia 
of the behaviours is strong, the single currency will have little by little in the euro system a larger 
part than that of the currencies of the eleven, which exceeds 26% for the time being in the 
liabilities of banks located in industrialised countries.
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The quantitative aspects of the international role of the euro are difficult to control. The 
mechanisms are known, but not the volumes that will be affected. They will depend on the 
demand and the functions that this currency can fulfill, as well as the supply and the quantities 
that can be used. But the use of national currencies is not sufficient to characterise the 
international monetary system, which is also based on changing rules and on an institution whose 
role is growing. 
The euro and the IMF  
These are the countries that are members of the IMF (article II of its statutes). The eleven 
member countries of the Monetary Union therefore remained members of the Fund: each 
retained its own share. After the last increase, which came into force in January 1999, the 
combined quotas of the eleven represent 23% of the total quota. This is more than that of the 
United States (17.5%), and it would be even more if the fifteen countries of the Community had 
all participated in the Monetary Union (30%, notably because of the United Kingdom). Quotas 
determine the subscription paid by each country, the assistance it may request and the voting 
rights it may exercise (Kirrane 1993).  
Voting rights raise a problem, not at the level of the Board of Governors in which each country 
has its own, which exercises its voting rights, but on the Board of Directors which comprises 24 
directors. Eight are named, each by one country, this is the case of France and Germany. Sixteen 
are elected by the countries that have formed into so many Groups. The other nine members of 
the Union are found in six of these Groups. Sometimes they are the main constituent: Italy and 
Portugal are associated with Greece, Malta and Albania; Belgium, Luxembourg and Austria are 
also associated with Turkey, Hungary, the Czech and Slovak Republics, Belarus and Kazakhstan. 
Finally, the Netherlands has half of the voting rights that can be exercised by a Group that also 
includes Israel, Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Croatia. These three directors are respectively 
Italian, Belgian and Dutch. In other Groups, on the other hand, the European countries are 
clearly ‘minoritarians’. Spain is isolated next to Mexico, Venezuela, El Salvador, Honduras like 
Finland alongside the Scandinavian countries and the Baltic countries, and like Ireland which is 
part of a Group from twelve countries involving Canada and the Central American countries, 
such as the Bahamas and St. Lucia. At the present time, eight out of twenty-four administrators 
are directly or indirectly concerned by the problems of the euro while everyone has to use their 
votes as a whole! (art XII, 3i).
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 Transactions in Euro-currencies are transactions in foreign currencies. Banks located in eleven countries have 39% of foreign 
currency liabilities to residents ($ 1.399 billion) and 35% foreign currency liabilities to non-residents ($ 7.019 billion). 
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 This percentage is certainly below the level of the whole system, since the mark, the franc or the read are less present in the 
balance sheets of banks in Mexico or Korea than in Canada or Switzerland! The currencies also represent 32.5% of national 
currency liabilities to non-residents. 
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 The countries of the Franc Zone are, with some neighboring countries, part of the same Group, so they have the same 
administrator. But since they have the same currency, their relations with the IMF have also raised the problems we are going to 
talk about. But of course we cannot compare the CFA franc and the euro. 




Things should change gradually as elected directors reach the end of their term. But on the one 
hand, several Groups elected their directors in 1998, when the establishment of the Monetary 
Union was near and its contours were already well known. The fact that the directors are not 
elected at the same time does not facilitate the reorganisation of the Groups. On the other hand, 
the same problem will arise when the Union expands and welcomes new member countries. But 
the eleven wished that pragmatic solutions be found to ensure their representation in the Fund. 
Already, the Governing Body has agreed to grant observer status to the ECB. And the Vienna 
European Council in December 1998 called for the Union's point of view to be presented by the 
Director representing the country holding the Presidency of the Group of Eleven, assisted by a 
representative of the Commission. 
Another difficulty will come into play when quotas are revised. The increase is now selective, it 
is determined according to certain criteria, the most important of which are the level of the 
reserves of each country and its participation in international trade. The reserves of each of the 
eleven will probably decrease but weakly. On the one hand, they no longer include the currencies 
of their partners which, converted into euros, have become national currency and are 
consolidated. On the other hand, the national central banks, whose dollar holdings are now 
managed, at least in part, by the ECB, no longer each needs to defend their national currency. 
This impact will remain limited because the 11 countries hold only 17.5% of all foreign currency 
assets at the end of 1998, but more than 41% of the gold reserves do not vary. 
The international trade of the eleven will also decrease, and more importantly. The exports and 
imports of each country also include transactions with their partners, which account for about 
50%. Can intra-Community trade, which is settled in euros, be considered as international trade? 
These are transactions with foreign countries, but they are done without foreign exchange 
transactions. If they were to be excluded, the share of each of the eleven, and the ensuing voting 
rights, would be substantially reduced. It is likely that by the next revision, probably in 2004, the 
above criteria will be scrutinised. One of the most important roles of the Fund is the financial 
assistance to member countries in difficulty. In fact, it is now - for twenty years - intended for 
developing countries. But it is always open to all countries that must be treated on an equal 
footing. It is difficult to see France or Spain asking for help from the IMF, any more than the 
countries of the South: they have made considerable efforts to respect the convergence criteria; 
they will have to respect the stability pact; their economic policy will have to be coordinated 
with that of their partners (Kirrane 1996). Finally, financial assistance is available in the 
European framework, not to mention the Structural Funds, raised to 30 billion euros per year. 
But if one of the eleven ever had a balance of payments deficit and wanted to apply for help from 
the Fund, could the conditions be discussed without any intervening community authority? 
(Polak 1997)And if the euro should one day be supported against the dollar or the yen, or simply 
if it could fluctuate sharply, how could the Fund negotiate and put in place a safety net (Deppler 
1998)? 
Another important question posed to the IMF about the arrival of the euro on the international 
scene concerns the surveillance that it must exercise on the exchange rate policies of the member 
countries, in terms of article IV of its statutes. This monitoring involves regular consultations 
with national authorities. They must also be done with the community authorities. Article 109 of 
the Maastricht Treaty specifies the conditions under which formal (Bretton Woods type) or 
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informal (Plaza-Louvre type) exchange rate agreements may be concluded by the Union. In both 
cases, the responsibility lies with the Ecofin Council, but the ECB is directly involved because it 
has to be consulted in order to respect the objective of price stability. These two bodies are 
therefore the privileged interlocutors of the Fund in its supervisory role, which also extends to 
monetary policy, this is still the ECB's business, and to economic policy (Kirrane 1993). The 
Fund's monitoring is thus at two levels, national and supranational.  
The monitoring of exchange rate policies is complemented by international coordination of the 
major economic and monetary guidelines of the main industrialized countries in the G7. France, 
Italy and Germany are among them. The President of the Commission participates in the G7 
summits, but the Community is not represented and is not involved in their preparation. The 
Luxembourg European Council in December 1997 called for a pragmatic solution to ensure 
representation of the euro area. The Vienna European Council in December 1998 proposed that 
March President of the ECOFIN Council, or if this president comes from a country that is not 
part of the area, the chairman of the Council of euro participates with the ECB in discussions on 
the euro. In addition, a representative of the Commission will be part of the Community 
delegation to assist the President of the Ecofin Council or the Council of the Euro. 
The introduction of the euro also has implications for the Fund's operations. Each Member State 
has paid in its currency three-quarters of its share. The assets of the Fund in the currencies of the 
eleven were converted into euros at the conversion rate of 31 December 1998. On that day, the 
Fund held 17 billion euros, which represented almost 10% of its foreign currency holdings and 
exceeded its dollar holdings (7%). These euros may remain held in accounts open to the Fund by 
each of the eleven central banks but some countries may designate the ECB as the ‘custodian’ of 
the Fund's assets. Even if all eleven did so, the ECB should isolate the Fund's assets on behalf of 
everyone. Moreover, when the Fund transfers or receives euros in a transaction with a third 
country, it is the currency of a country that it uses, and the debt of that country - its reserve 
position in the Fund - is modified.
9
 This Reserve Position determines a number of rights and 
obligations. It is the remuneration that the country will receive, it is its contribution to the 
‘distribution of charges’ related to the unpaid ones which reduce the receipts of the Fund, it is its 
obligation to buy back its currency. This is why the Fund is obliged, when it uses euros, to 
specify which euros it is: French, Portuguese, Austrian, as it must distinguish the Ivorian CFA 
francs, Togolese or Cameroonian (Kirrane 1993).  
And this choice itself raises a difficulty, not only which euros to choose, but why euros rather 
than dollars, pounds, Swiss francs, Saudi riyals. The question has been decided since a long time, 
with the technique of operating budgets. The Fund examines quarterly which countries are in a 
sufficiently strong position with regard to their balance of payments and reserves, so that they 
can transfer their currency into drawdowns. And, day by day, it uses the currencies thus selected 
according to a criterion that has changed several times and which was recently the reserves of 
each country.
10
 The arrival of the euro naturally disrupted this procedure. The reference to 
                                                          
9
 The Reserve Position is equal to the difference between the quota of a country and the assets of the Fund in its currency, if this 
difference is positive. It therefore corresponds, initially, to the payment of the in reserve assets (gold, SDRs or currencies). A 
negative difference measures the "use of the credit of the Fund "which characterizes a debtor position of the country. 
10
 We only consider draws here, but redemptions are also made in registered currencies. in another budget, in order to gradually 
equalize the relationship between the country's Reserve Position concerned and their share. 




reserves, already discussed with the extension of floating exchange rates and the free movement 
of capital, as the reference to the balance of payments, have lost their meaning in the case of the 
eleven. Could the situation of any one of the eleven countries, measured by its reserves and 
balance of payments, lead to its currency not being included in the budget, while its currency is 
also that of its partners? 
The euro also has consequences for the SDR system: on their use, on their holding, on their 
value, on their return. On their use: a country can use its SDRs to buy a currency by transferring 
it to another country that can be designated by the Fund - the procedure has fallen into disuse - or 
with which it gets along directly or because the other country has committed, under a standing 
agreement, to receive - or to transfer - SDRs on fixed terms. This country must give in exchange 
‘a freely usable currency’. Five currencies were considered as such, including the franc and the 
mark. The euro is too. In fact, the dollar has been used so far in most of these transactions. It will 
be interesting to see how far the euro is going to be used from now on. The Fund may grant 
certain institutions the status of ‘approved holder’. It may therefore, in its name, hold, use and 
receive SDRs, in transactions with countries, with other authorised holders, with the Fund itself. 
It could in turn sign a permanent agreement with the Fund that would allow it to play a certain 
role in the system. On their value: the value of the SDR is that of a basket of five currencies 
whose weights and quantities are modified at each revision, every five years. Already the mark 
and the franc have been replaced by the euro without changing the value of the SDR.  
The advent of the euro will completely change the international monetary system. The 
importance and the novelty of this shock make any attempt at forecasting delicate. A currency 
replaces a dozen others, not currencies of small or developing countries, but currencies of major 
industrialised countries, some of which already had a role, and which was not modest, on the 
international scene. And it was done suddenly, on a given day, and announced in recent years. 
Worse, it will be renewed when other countries decide to participate in the adventure, probably 
soon Britain - which means that the pound will disappear - maybe one day too, the Central 
European countries whose economy was planned not ten years ago! 
In international relations, the reaction has been rapid. The euro is already widely used, especially 
in financial transactions. But its development depends on many factors that are hard to control 
for the moment. Was it not foreseen that the new currency would be a strong currency? In fact, it 
lost 12% of its value in six months. Was not it also wrong about its use in each country and the 
rate at which people would ‘move to the euro’. They will have six months in 2002 to get the 
notes and coins but they are three years old in their bank accounts. Was this passage going to be 
fast, regular and general, or slow, jerky and sectoral? And was it going to be done at the same 
pace in each of the eleven countries? There is little information for now. But it seems that the 
factors of resistance have prevailed over the attraction of change and novelty. 
At the international level everything is clearer. But it remains very difficult to predict how the 
role of the euro will evolve, and how the monetary polycentrism that has been talked about for a 
long time will actually be put in place. The decisions of the economic agents will be decisive and 
the role of the markets will be essential. The modalities and effectiveness of international co-
operation will be just as important. The consequences of the changeover to the euro on IMF 
operations, as well as on surveillance, which is now one of its main responsibilities, are 
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